A Constitutional Commitment to Religious Freedom
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I am a Christian, and I do not believe that defending my faith requires me to diminish the freedom of someone else's.
Quite the opposite.
I believe religious liberty means exactly what it says. It protects the Christian, the Muslim, the Jew, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Sikh, people of all other faiths, and those who profess no faith at all. It protects the faith I profess, and it protects the conscience of people whose beliefs I may profoundly disagree with.
That is not a concession I make reluctantly. It is a principle I believe is fundamental to the American experiment.
Whatever right I claim for myself, I will defend for my neighbor.
If I have the right to worship according to my conscience, so does the Muslim, the Jew, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Sikh, every person of every other faith—and the person who professes no faith at all.
If I have the right to build a church, then my Muslim neighbor has the right to build a mosque, my Jewish neighbor a synagogue, and others a house of worship according to their own convictions.
If I may speak publicly about my faith, another American may speak publicly about theirs.
If I may seek public office without being disqualified because I am a Christian, a Muslim, Jew, Hindu, atheist, or person of another belief must receive that same protection.
And if the government ever possesses the power to deny those liberties to someone whose religion I disagree with, then it possesses the same power to deny them to me.
Our Constitutional Guarantee
This principle is not merely an aspiration. It is written into the supreme law of our nation and expressly protected by the Constitution of Arkansas.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
— First Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Constitution of Arkansas is equally clear.
Article 2, § 24 — Religious liberty states in full:
“All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship; or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of worship, above any other.”
Article 2, § 25 — Protection of religion states:
“Religion, morality and knowledge being essential to good government, the General Assembly shall enact suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.”
And Article 2, § 26 — Religious tests states:
“No religious test shall ever be required of any person as a qualification to vote or hold office; nor shall any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations.”
Those words matter to me because, as a candidate for the Arkansas Senate, I am seeking an office whose authority comes from that Constitution.
Article 2 does not tell the General Assembly to protect only the religious denomination of the majority. It says “every religious denomination.”
It does not permit government to favor one denomination or mode of worship over another. It says “no preference shall ever be given.”
It does not make freedom of conscience dependent upon whether those in power approve of someone's beliefs. It declares that “No human authority can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of conscience.”
And it does not condition public service upon adherence to a particular religion. It declares that “No religious test shall ever be required.”
Those protections belong to all Arkansans.
They protect me as a Christian, and I will defend them just as firmly when they protect the Muslim, the Jew, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Sikh, the adherent of any other faith, or the person who professes no faith at all.
Our Constitution does not require me to agree with someone's theology before their liberty deserves protection.
Neither will I.
An American Tradition of Religious Liberty
This understanding of religious liberty is not foreign to our history. It runs deeply through the American tradition.
This understanding of religious liberty is not foreign to our history. It runs deeply through the American tradition.
In his autobiography, Thomas Jefferson recalled with satisfaction that, during the struggle to enact Virginia's landmark Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786, the legislature had “rejected by a great majority” an effort to narrow the bill's scope:
“In proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan.”
— Thomas Jefferson, recalling the passage of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, 1786
Jefferson understood something essential: religious liberty ceases to be religious liberty when government decides which religions qualify for its protection.
Benjamin Franklin similarly described the broad religious openness of a meetinghouse established in Philadelphia:
“Both house and ground were vested in trustees, expressly for the use of any preacher of any religious persuasion who might desire to say something to the people at Philadelphia; the design in building not being to accommodate any particular sect, but the inhabitants in general; so that even if the Mufti of Constantinople were to send a missionary to preach Mohammedanism to us, he would find a pulpit at his service.”
— Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography
Franklin did not have to accept Islam as his own religion to recognize the freedom of a Muslim to preach it. That distinction matters. Protecting another person's religious liberty does not require agreement with that person's theology. It requires respect for that person's liberty of conscience.
During the debate surrounding Massachusetts's 1780 Constitution, Reverend Samuel West argued that the protection of religious conscience was not confined to Christians, but extended broadly across religious belief:
“The most ample Liberty of conscience imaginable … to Deists, Mahometans, Jews, and Christians.”
— Reverend Samuel West, Massachusetts constitutional debate, 1780
During Virginia's debate over religious assessments, Richard Henry Lee likewise argued that genuine religious liberty necessarily extended beyond Christianity:
“The declaration of Rights, it seems to me, rather contends against forcing modes of faith and forms of worship, than against compelling contribution for the support of religion in general. I fully agree with the Presbyterians, that true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo as well as the Christian religion.”
— Richard Henry Lee, November 26, 1784
That phrase deserves particular attention: true freedom.
True freedom is not simply freedom for the majority. It is not freedom for people whose beliefs are familiar, popular, or culturally dominant. A principle proves itself precisely when it protects someone with whom we disagree.
Baptist minister and religious-liberty advocate John Leland likewise argued that religious belief should not determine a citizen's eligibility for public office:
“Let a man be pagan, Turk, Jew or Christian, he is eligible to any post in that government.”
— John Leland, 1791
These principles were not confined to prominent political and religious leaders. Ordinary Virginians also appealed for the religious liberty of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. In 1785, citizens of Chesterfield County petitioned the Virginia General Assembly:
“Let Jews, Mehometans and Christians of every denomination enjoy religious liberty… thrust them not out now by establishing the Christian religion lest thereby we become our own enemys and weaken this infant state. It is mens labour in our Manufactories, their services by sea and land that aggrandize our Country and not their creeds. Chain your citizens to the state by their Interest. Let Jews, Mehometans, and Christians of every denomination find their advantage in living under your laws.”
— Chesterfield County Petition, November 14, 1785
Those citizens understood that our country is strengthened when Americans are judged by their conduct and contribution rather than by their creed.
During the North Carolina Convention's debate over ratification of the United States Constitution, James Iredell—who would later become a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court—responded directly to concerns that the Constitution's prohibition on religious tests could allow pagans or Muslims to hold public office:
“It is objected that the people of America may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?”
— James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention, 1788
That question remains just as powerful today.
How can we demand religious freedom for ourselves while denying it to someone else?
How can we insist that government has no authority to punish us for our faith while asking that same government to discriminate against our neighbor because of theirs?
Religious liberty cannot operate that way.
During John Adams's presidency, the United States ratified the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tripoli in 1797. Article 11 expressly addressed the relationship between the American government, Christianity, and the Muslim world:
“The Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion” and possessed no hostility toward the “religion, or tranquility, of Mussulmen.”
The article continued by stating that the United States had not entered into hostility against a Muslim nation on account of religion and declared that religious differences should never become a cause of conflict between the two countries.
— Article 11, Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tripoli, ratified under President John Adams, 1797
And decades later, while serving as president in 1843, John Tyler described the Constitution's protection of religious liberty as extending explicitly to Muslims and other non-Christian faiths:
“The Mahommedan, if he will to come among us would have the privilege guaranteed to him by the constitution to worship according to the Koran.”
Tyler continued by explaining that a Hindu could likewise erect a shrine to Brahma, emphasizing the broader constitutional principle:
“No religious establishment by law exists among us. The conscience is left free from all restraint.”
— President John Tyler, 1843
The Principle I Will Defend
That is the tradition I stand in.
I do not have to believe that every religion is theologically correct to believe that every American possesses the same freedom of conscience.
I do not have to surrender my Christian convictions to defend a Muslim's right to worship according to the Quran.
I do not have to practice Judaism to defend the right of a Jewish family to worship freely.
I do not have to share the beliefs of a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, or member of any other faith to defend their right to worship according to their own conscience.
And I do not have to agree with an atheist, agnostic, or person who professes no religion to defend their right not to believe.
That is the very point of religious liberty.
Our Constitution does not require us to agree with one another. It creates space in which people who profoundly disagree can nevertheless live beside one another as equal citizens under the law.
For me, this principle is inseparable from both my understanding of constitutional government and my faith.
As a Christian, I believe every person bears the image of God. As an American, I believe government has no rightful authority to establish religious orthodoxy, impose religious tests, or divide citizens into favored and disfavored faiths.
So I will defend the religious freedom of Christians.
I will defend the religious freedom of Jews.
I will defend the religious freedom of Muslims.
I will defend the religious freedom of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and members of other faiths.
And I will defend the freedom of those who profess no religion at all.
Not because I believe all religions are the same.
Not because I believe every theological claim is equally true.
But because religious liberty is either a right possessed equally by every person or it eventually becomes a privilege granted by whoever happens to hold power.
I want no government with the authority to decide whether my Christianity is acceptable enough to practice.
Therefore, I will never ask government to exercise that authority over the Muslim, the Jew, the atheist, or anyone else.
The measure of our commitment to liberty is not whether we defend the rights of people who think, worship, vote, or live exactly as we do.
The measure comes when we defend those rights for someone with whom we disagree.
That is why my position is simple:
Whatever constitutional right I claim for myself, I will defend for my neighbor.
Their exercise of that right does not diminish mine.
It proves that the right still exists.
With respect for all Arkansans,
Joshua Irby
Paid for by Joshua Irby
